Transitions to good governance by Trautvetter, Christoph
European Research Centre for 
Anti-Corruption and State-Building  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transitions to Good Governance: 
A Case Study of South Korea 
 
 
Christoph Trautvetter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2010 
www.againstcorruption.eu 
 
E
R
C
A
S
 W
o
rk
in
g
 P
a
p
e
rs
 
  2 
   
Table of Contents 
 
Tables and Figures 2 
Transitions to good governance and the political economy of South Korea 3 
1. Transitions revisited 4 
From agriculture to industry 4 
From authoritarianism to democracy 4 
From particularism to universalism 5 
2. The development of rents and pluralism 5 
Comparing Korea and Asia 6 
Development of pluralism and rents – an overview 7 
US aid and the Korean budget 8 
Economic policies and market domination through the Chaebol 9 
Democracy, parties and political finance 10 
Connecting rents and pluralism 11 
3. Actors and drivers for change 13 
4. Reducing the market power of the Chaebol 16 
5. Conclusion 18 
6. References 20 
 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Determinants of Corruption in Korea and Asia 6 
Table 2: US aid to Korea (Source: Mason (1980:182)) 8 
Table 3: Development of political finance (Source: You (2005:14)) 11 
Table 4: Trust and values (Source: Asia Barometer) 14 
 
Figure 1: Pluralism and rents 1945-2009 (recoded, from 0 to 10 being more democratic/less corrupt)
 7 
Figure 2: Selected expenditure categories of the Korean budget (Source: UN national accounts) 9 
Figure 3: Deregulation (Source: Fraser Institute, economic freedom of the world) 17 
Figure 4: Activating the KFTC (Source: KFTC, statistical yearbook 2009) 17 
Figure 5: Source: KFTC, statistical yearbook 2010 18 
  
  3 
   
Transitions to good governance and the political economy of South 
Korea 
 
“…meaningful crackdowns were not possible until the first civilian government of Kim Young Sam.”  
(Yoon, 2010:66, Law and Democracy in South Korea) 
  
“…since the late 1980s, and especially under Mr Kim Young-Sam, cronyistic relationships have 
spread into some key manufacturing sectors.”  
(Jwa and Lee, 2004:47, Competition and Corporate Governance in South Korea)  
 
As the above quotes show, authors disagree widely on the role of democracy in the fight against 
corruption and on the evaluation of corruption in the different periods of Korea’s history. Based on 
various studies of corruption, political economy analyses and sociology, this paper tries to 
substantiate this relationship with quantitative as well as qualitative evidence. Before analyzing the 
development of political rents, norms of impartiality, the influence of different political actors and the 
incentives that drive their actions, this paper will take a broader look at the history of transition in 
South Korea.  
Korea differs quite strongly from most other developing countries in that it managed to strongly 
redistribute wealth following the Korean War, to build a strong and effective executive despite 
authoritarianism, to obtain universal literacy and an autonomous middle-class despite state capture, 
and by having a culture of public responsibility and frugal elites. These rather unique developments 
are partly but not exclusively explained by the strong pressure of the communist North, the Korean 
war and the strong influence from both the US and Japan. The paper argues that apart from 
transitions to good governance, there are at least two others that are not always separated clearly in 
literature and that South Korea is a perfect example to illustrate all three and to make clear their 
distinction. 
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1. Transitions revisited  
 
From agriculture to industry  
The traditional works of political economy describe the transition from agricultural, often monarchical 
or feudal societies to more complex, industrial societies. The main adaptive pressure there came 
from the increasing complexity of societies and new interest groups such as labor unions. According 
to John Lie (1998), South Korea entered the industrial age with inherited knowledge from the 
Japanese occupation and under very drastic and unique conditions in the 1950s. Between 1950 and 
1953, the Korean War killed 10% of South Korea’s population and destroyed most of the assets 
(„we've all been poor once”). In these circumstances, strong public pressure and the fear of popular 
reforms in North Korea lead the government under Rhee and the US administration to introduce 
land reforms somewhat against their will. In consequence, in 1956 the 6% richest Koreans only 
owned 18% of the land, compared to 3% owning 64% of the land in 1944. According to both Lie and 
You (2005), this redistribution laid the ground for growth and contestation in the years to follow. Next 
to land reform, different authors find many different reasons for the successful economic 
development, ranging from government led discrimination and development policy (Jwa and Lee, 
2006) to the Japanese investments and marketing networks (Kim and Kim, 2006). High growth and 
industrialization in turn increased the complexity of the society which decreased the efficiency of 
state-led development. 
  
From authoritarianism to democracy  
A more recent perspective on transition looks at the shift from communism/authoritarianism to 
democracy following the end of Cold War. According to Horowitz (2002) South Korea went through 
a similar development starting in 1987, triggered by popular unrest (that was growing since the 
1950s) combined with the decreasing appeal of Japanese-style, state-led development (following 
the burst of the Japanese bubble, the growing weakness of the North Korean state and the end of 
Cold War) and the increasing appeal of the US. In line with these findings, Ahn (2003) in his 
investigations of the Korean political elite over the last century finds a shift from Japanese educated 
personnel to US education. For example while there was still a significant part of Japanese 
educated judges in the 5th Republic (1979 -1987) they completely disappeared till 1997 and the 
share of US graduates increased significantly among the other professions.  
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From particularism to universalism  
The transition that shall be the focus of this paper, concerns the transition from corruption to 
impartiality and from particularistic privileges to universalism. Such a transition usually entails 
overcoming privileges of the ruling class (as happened in Korea in the 1950s) and is often but not 
always associated to democracy and free markets (1987). At the same time it entails the 
establishment of rule of law and of state autonomy that enable the state to intervene as a regulating 
and redistributing force in favor of universalism. Recent economic analysis shows that highly 
developed representative democracies with complex markets facilitate lobbying for particularistic 
subsidies and policies, where individual gains are high and costs are socialized (the collective action 
problem)1. Further, wealthy individuals often manage to establish the privilege of earning interests 
beyond risk premiums and the rise of productivity and therefore wealth as much as power is 
accumulating in the absence of substantial wealth taxes. 
Korea today shares many of the problems known from the USA, Germany and elsewhere, where 
lobbyism, corporate party financing, capture by sophistication or by the too big too fail phenomenon 
lead to particularistic policies. You (2005) describes the creation of a strong and successful 
bureaucracy in the 60s and 70s under authoritarian rule, and Lie (1998) confirms that ever 
increasing shares of public expenditure came along with efforts of efficiency reforms and output 
legitimacy2. In contrast, Yanagamichi (2003) finds that the liberalization of the 80s and 90s has 
weakened this bureaucracy and, with the absence of shareholder or market control, has led to 
increasing dominance of big corporations, the so-called Chaebol. The (private) privilege arising from 
flawed privatization and quasi monopolies was not only a major source of corruption (e.g. president 
Roh's slush funds, the fur-gate scandal of 1999 or the Samsung scandal of 2007). But even 
journalists report that instead of being influenced by the government (only 0,1%) they feel influenced 
by companies such as Samsung that control up to 30% of their advertising budgets (TI, 2006: 58).  
 
2. The development of rents and pluralism 
 
Over the last 70 years, the nature of rents as well as the governance mode in Korea have changed 
various times. Korea developed from a former colony to a predatory state under Rhee, was 
destroyed and dependent on US aid following the war of the 1950s, became a strong developmental 
                                               
1
 See for example: Rajan and Zingalis (2003): “Saving capitalism from the capitalists”, or Friedman (1980): “Free to 
choose”. 
2
 Park (2004) calls this: “state capture under good governance.” 
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state under Park, saw the rise of the Chaebol, the shift to democracy in 1987, and increased efforts 
to fight corruption after the Asian crisis of 1997. 
 
Comparing Korea and Asia  
You (2005) uses the Philippines and Taiwan to explore South Korea’s development and fight 
against corruption in a regional context. Like Taiwan, Korea has achieved comparatively high GDP 
and education building on low inequality after the land reform of the 50s. At the same time 
corruption in Korea stays comparatively high given its economic development due to its reliance on 
big corporations. With less democracy and higher reliance on small and medium sized enterprises, 
Taiwan seems to have fared better. 
 
Table 1: Determinants of Corruption in Korea and Asia 
Indicator  South Korea (2008) Average (SE)  - all Asia 
WGI corruption  0,45 -0,22 (1) 
WGI stability  0,17 0,05 (1) 
WGI voice  0,59 -0,24 (1) 
GDP p.c.  13593 4555 (8200) 
Education 77 45,48 (19,8) 
Gini  31,6 36,48 (6,5) 
Regulation (FI)  5,78 5,98 (1) 
Press freedom  30 49,58 (24,15) 
Trade freedom  64,2 62,53 (17,8) 
Political control  0,71 0,56 (0,29) 
Ethnic fragm.  0,001 0,35 (0,25) 
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Development of pluralism and rents – an overview  
Graph 1 below shows the development of pluralism since independence (blue and red lines) 
compared to the latest available data on overall corruption perception (green and purple). 
 
Figure 1: Pluralism and rents 1945-2009 (recoded, from 0 to 10 being more democratic/less 
corrupt) 
 
 
The major developments are:  
 The replacement of Rhee following population wide demonstrations and the election of the 
People’s Republic in 1960,  
 The coup d’etat by Park in 1961 followed by his confirmation in the elections of 1963 that were 
held mainly as a consequence of US pressure,  
 The application of martial law following the economic crisis of 1972 (the shift of power from Park 
to Chu in 1979 doesn’t change the pluralism score),  
 Democratic elections in 1987 and the first non-military president in 1992 followed by a 
honeymoon phase in the perception of corruption,  
 The consolidation of democracy and slow increases in corruption perception from 1999 (2 years 
after the financial crisis) onwards, under two presidents from the opposition parties.  
 
Building upon this general overview, we’ll now look for evidence on the development of corruption 
beyond perception and based on budget data, estimates of political finance, as well as the 
development of market concentration. Rather than equating big budgets, high corporate party 
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financing or monopolies with rents the paper tries to weigh those potential sources of bad 
governance with evidence from governance outcomes (e.g. aid and economic subsidies can be 
used for cronyism or to support the development of education and pluralism, political finance can be 
considered as a quasi-tax if it’s universal or cronyism if it’s linked to concrete favors, big 
corporations can exercise economic and political power but might also be necessary as market 
makers in international competition3). 
  
US aid and the Korean budget  
Following independence and in the decade following the Korean War, US civil and military aid 
played a major role, amounting up to 4,5% of GDP and mainly focusing on import subsidies for food, 
petrol, and military supplies. According to Mason (2008:196) “both US and Korean officials (were) 
heavily involved in the distribution of the coveted raw materials”. 
 
Table 2: US aid to Korea (Source: Mason (1980:182)) 
 
 
According to Ahn (2003), budgets increased by a factor of 40 under Park (between 1961 and 1976) 
while civil service increased from 240,000 to 520,000. Nevertheless the budget from 1970 to 2005 
shows a consistently high and increasing share of expenditure devoted to education. Data on 
education outcomes, economic growth and the value of investments seem to indicate that a big part 
of these resources has been put to good use. Till today, Korea's military budget is increasing at 
constantly high rates but its overall share in expenditure has declined due to fast economic growth. 
                                               
3 
For a discussion of this issue, see Kim and Kim (2006). 
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Again this could be a sign of high but decreasing influence of the military on the government or of 
decreasing economic and military power of North Korea. 
 
Figure 2: Selected expenditure categories of the Korean budget (Source: UN national 
accounts) 
 
 
Economic policies and market domination through the Chaebol  
Economic and political power of Korea’s big corporations (the Chaebol) and their owner-families are 
both a major result and a source for rent-seeking. Nevertheless, both their importance and the 
exercise of their power have changed over time. The history of the major corporations in South 
Korea goes back to the Japanese occupation when most of the so-called Chaebol were founded. 
Privatization and re-nationalization of the Japanese companies was a major source of corruption 
under Rhee. Most analysts argue that economic policies following Rhee were rather universalistic 
with “explicit and clear performance criteria” (Jwa and Lee (2004:12) and the rise of the Chaebol 
only started with the focus on capital-intensive industries and the emergency decree for economic 
stability and growth in the 1970s. Lee Kyu-Uck (1995) confirms this finding of increasing market 
concentration in Korea’s manufacturing industry in the 70s. According to Kang (2002: 198), 
democratization and liberalization of the 1980s and 90s lead to further increasing market power of 
the Chaebols. 
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Comparable figures for the years after the Asian crisis of 1997 are hard to find as corporation-wide 
reporting was only introduced in 2009. The KFTC instead uses simple concentration ratios that 
measure the market share of the 3 biggest firms in all markets identified according to the standard 
industrial classification (see Graph 5 in chapter 4). 
In line with the development of market power of the largely family-owned conglomerates, inequality 
increased from very low values following the land reform of the 1950s with a Gini of 26.3 till 1969, to 
30.6 till 1989, 32.7 till 1997 and 35.6 in 20004 while recent data shows some decline. 
 
Democracy, parties and political finance  
Kang (2002) and You (2005) find that already during Park's dictatorship and partly due to the 
elections of 1963 imposed by international pressure, a huge party machinery with up to 3,9 million 
members had to be built up in very short time. They further find some evidence of punishments for 
business supporting the opposition and a continuous increase in political finance in line with the 
growing economic power of Chaebols. At the return to democracy in 1987 the need for political 
finance seem to have increased drastically again and the illegal slush funds of the first democratic 
presidents seem to confirm this story. On the other hand, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun have 
managed to be elected against the candidate supported by big Chaebols (see Samsung scandal of 
2008). Interestingly, while Kang finds some evidence of personal enrichment during Park’s regime, 
the Korean elite till today leads a more frugal life than is known from other countries. 
 
  
                                               
4 Source: You (2005: 19, 33). Some caution is necessary in the interpretation of this data, since non-income related 
preferential tradings of land and stocks significantly increase inequality. 
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Table 3: Development of political finance (Source: You (2005:14)) 
President Period 
Top-level political donations (1990 constant 
billion won) 
Rhee Syngman 1948-1960 1.5-3.5 (five chaebol) 
Park Chung-Hee 1961-1972 5-10 (estimated) 
Park Chung-Hee 1972-1979 7-10 (estimated) 
Chun Doo-Whan 1980-1987 16-24 (four chaebol) 
Roh Tae-Woo 1988-1992 21-25 (four chaebol) 
Kim Young-Sam 1993-1997 56 (Hanbo) 
Kim Dae-Jung 1998-2002 8 to Lee (Samsung) 
Roh Moo-Hyun 2003-2004 22 to Lee (Samsung) 
 
Connecting rents and pluralism  
In conclusion, there is no clear evidence on the connection between rents and pluralism, while there 
is some evidence of increasing need for spoils at transitory periods (elections of 1963 and 1987) 
and a shift from public to private privilege with minor improvements following the Asian crisis in 
1997. Based on the five categories suggested in Mungiu-Pippidi (2006: 94), Korea remains at the 
stage of competitive particularism with political access still limited by high costs to establish a party 
and the big dependence on the big corporations, but state capture under good governance (Park, 
2004) might describe the situation better. 
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Regime type Power distribution/access 
Rents and state 
‘ownership’ 
Distribution of public 
goods 
Legitimacy/ Social 
acceptability of 
corruption 
Distinction 
public/private 
State-capture 
under good 
governance  
 Government has 
changed three times 
through democratic 
elections  
 Business friendly party 
has lost despite illegal 
party funding but 
business exerts a strong 
influence on public 
opinion  
 Elites are selected 
among SKY universities 
that have competitive 
entry exams  
 Ex-presidents, business 
leaders and high officials 
are repeatedly sued but 
receive low punishments 
[TI, NIS:61]  
 Presidential powers are 
very high, ministers’ 
tenure very low  
 Ombudsman, 
whistleblowers, media 
and civil society are 
working fairly well  
 Size of the Chaebol 
provides privileged 
access to loans but 
debt/equity ratios 
are decreasing 
since the Asian 
crisis  
 Bail-outs for 
Chaebol (1974, 
1987, 1997)  
 Increasing cronyism 
in return for political 
party finance (e.g. 
Samsung scandal)  
 Public Procurement 
amounts to 10% of 
GDP, 92% of it is 
done through GePS 
[TI, NIS]  
 
 Promotions are 
competitive and 
apolitical but major 
criterion is personal 
connection to the 
boss  
 Petty corruption is 
very low [TI, 
Corruption 
Barometer]  
 Favoritism in 
decisions of 
government officials 
is high (rank 86 of 
139) [WEF, Global 
Competitiveness 
Report]  
 In PISA 2006 
(Science) Korea 
scored above 
average and socio-
economic 
background was 
less important than 
in OECD average  
 Low trust in 
government, 
business and 
internationals 
(2,94; 2,74; 2,71 
with 4 meaning no 
trust) [Asia 
Barometer, 2003]  
 Low belief in 
government doing 
a good job in the 
fight against 
corruption (3,37 of 
4) [Asia Barometer 
2003]  
 Prestige of ex-
presidents is very 
low (assassination, 
imprisonments, 
suicide, low 
approval rates 
except for Park) 
[Ahn 2003:131ff]  
 Chaebols still 
employ family 
members but the 
influence of the 
owner-families 
seems to be 
decreasing [Ahn 
2003: 343]  
 The majority of 
Koreans believe that 
company profits 
belong to society 
rather than 
shareholders, 
Chaebol’s are 
perceived as social 
entities [Jwa and 
Lee, 2004: 49]  
 Korean elite 
displays 
comparative 
frugality  
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3. Actors and drivers for change 
 
The Korean president is directly elected and yields very strong power both over the appointment of 
key personnel in the executive (ministers have an average tenure below one year), administration 
and judiciary. Nevertheless, Byong-Man Ahn finds that Korean presidents from the 1950s till now 
suffer from consistently low approval rates, imprisonment following their demise, family scandals 
involving their sons, and strong pressure for fulfilling the public good that even lead to president 
Roh (2002) committing suicide following corruption investigations against him. Furthermore hardly 
any president (or dictator) came from influential families or inherited the office instead a refugee 
from Japan (Park), from China (Chun), a former clerk of a Japanese company (Dae-Jung), the son 
of an unimportant provincial clan (Lee) made it to the highest position. An exception to this rule is 
Mr Rhee who was an aristocrat and came to power with the support of the USA in 1946. Of the 
famous opposition leaders from various democratic movements that presided over big anti-
corruption efforts, Youn Po Sun (1960) graduated in Edinburgh, Kim Dae-Jung (1997) got wealthy 
due to his collaboration with Japanese occupation and suffered various arrests, exiles and 
assassination attempts till he made it into government after 40 years of opposition, Kim Young-Sam 
(1993) had a long history in the national assembly, and finally Roh Moo-hyun (2002) previously 
worked as a human rights lawyer and political activist. Nevertheless, none of these histories 
prevented them and their family from involvement in some sort of corruption scandal.  
Korean civil society grew strong during its turbulent and often authoritarian history despite 
repression that often made use of anti-communist legislation and sentiments. It includes:  
 the so-called 518 generation of students and professors that experienced the Gwangju 
massacre of 1980 and the revolutionary protests in 1987 and that founded the Citizen 
Commission for Economic Justice  
 the association of Catholic Priests for Economic Justice that was formed in 1979 following 
the arrest of a bishop, includes about 90% of the Korean priests, and is active in election 
campaigns against corrupt politicians as well as in supporting court cases started by various 
whistleblowers  
 the internet platform „ohmynews“ that publishes citizens' reports and had up to 15 million 
clicks per day  
 small shareholder groups that lost out in the underperformance of Chaebols following the 
financial crisis and that are therefore increasingly using shareholder meetings to press for 
good corporate governance  
 14 
 together with 5556 other civil society organizations monitoring the government, and a public 
that according to AsiaBarometer (2003) stays very critical of its government's effort to fight 
corruption.  
 
Table 4: Trust and values (Source: Asia Barometer) 
Results AsiaBarometer 2003, n=800 
Happy (1 happy-4)  2.51 
Son as politician (0 no/1)  0,05 
Son as scholar  0,21 
Trust in central government (1 trust – 4)  2,94 
Trust in local government  2,90 
Trust in legal system  2,64 
Trust in domestic companies 2,74 
Trust in multinationals  2,71 
Government dealing with corruption (1 very well-4) 3,37 
 
While Koreans seem to become more and more critical of their government and against corruption, 
participation in the presidential elections of 2008 went down to a historically low 63%.  
Korean civil servants have life long tenure, comparatively good salaries and, apart from the 3 
highest grades, promotions are done independently by the Civil Service Commission while selection 
is competitive and meritocratic5. According to TI’s Corruption Barometer, petty bribes are very rare 
(even less than in New Zealand, Singapore, or Australia). The biggest share of civil servants comes 
from the Seoul National University with regional ties and discrimination playing a role, but recently 
variation has increased. Finally, Korean administration has been lauded various times to be an 
OECD pioneer in eGovernance, most notably in the introduction of their eProcurement system in 
2002 that handles more than 92% of government contracts and significantly increased 
transparency. 
                                               
5
 According to various surveys presented in Ahn (2003: 63f) personal credentials were the major reason for promotion in 
1972, whereas harmonious relationship with the superior and personal connections topped the list in 1987 and 2001 
respectively. 
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The political opposition and political parties in Korea have changed a lot and Lie (1998) finds a 
tendency for new parties and new coalitions to spring up like „young bamboos“ before elections. 
Elections of the National Assembly and of the president are held separately and in the few years in 
between party landscape changes significantly. Starting from the People’s Republic in 1960, 
opposition continued with strong support (about 40% of the electorate) throughout the military 
regime and created strong pressure for the government to legitimize its actions through successfully 
increasing GDP. Opposition was also strong at the return of free elections in 1987 but failed to win 
the government due to disunity. The only stable party, the Grand Nationalist Party, wins a 
consistent share of the votes of around 40% and is strongly connected to economic growth and the 
Chaebol, whereas the various democratic movements were the source of most anti-corruption 
efforts as far back as 1960.  
The military continues to receive very high (but decreasing) shares of the government's budget in 
line with the continuing threat from North Korea. Graduates from the military academy have 
continued to be over-represented among the country's elite, but this has significantly decreased. Lie 
(1998) attest them with little understanding of political, administrative, and economic challenges but 
high discipline and the rhetoric of a small and lenient state.  
External and particular US influence in South Korea has been historically strong but 
controversial. On the one hand the US supported the predatory regime of Rhee as well as the coup 
d'etat and the military dictatorship of Park. On the other hand they forced Park to hold elections in 
1963 and according to Kang (2002) issued (inconsequential) warnings of the potential danger of 
overleveraged, politically supported Chaebols as early as 1971. Mason (1980) further describes the 
relationship between USAID and the various Korean governments as a conflictual one. He finds 
some positive impact of the US on land reform (1940s) and on devaluation, lower deficits, control of 
inflation and maintenance of democratic elections under the new Park regime (1963 and 1964). 
Nevertheless he concludes that „attempts to use aid to bring about significant social and political 
changes have not been very successful“ (p.204). Starting in the late 60s Japanese aid and 
investment outgrew US engagement and by 2003 China has replaced the US as the biggest trading 
partner but the influence of private companies as well as US-educated Koreans was doubtlessly 
strong. The influence of US companies on the South Korean stock market and the banking sector 
increased significantly with the IMF-led reforms in 1997 (international firms then owned 40% of 
stocks and one third of the banks). 
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4. Reducing the market power of the Chaebol 
 
Big Chaebols already failed various times, for example in the 1971 crisis and the 1987 recession, 
but the business association (KFI) successfully lobbied for government bail-outs on a platform of 
loyalty and national interest6. Fighting against the growing Chaebol influence has been part of the 
governments’ platform at least since 1980. Chu introduced various regulations aimed at limiting the 
number of subsidiaries and cross-shareholdings as well as land tenure in conglomerates to reduce 
monopoly powers. Nevertheless those efforts failed for various reasons among them the fact that 
they were only followed on paper and concentrated too much on limiting the power of the big 
Chaebol rather than promoting competition. According to Yanagimachi (2004), serious efforts to 
replace state-control with regulation and shareholder controls only took off in the wake of the Asian 
crisis in 1997. As a sign of changing perceptions on the viability of industrial policy in the mass 
electorate, Kim Dae-Jung, opposition candidate since 1954, was elected without the support of the 
big Chaebol (Horowitz 2002). Together with IMF pressure (Korea accepted a $58 billion loan) he 
designed 5 principles to weaken the Chaebols (including reduction of cross shareholdings, 
introduction of external managers beyond the owner family), he abolished nearly 50% of business 
regulations (including the liberalization of interest rate policies and the access of foreign banks) and 
strengthened the Korean Free Trade Commission. According to Kalinowski (2009), this policy was 
supported by a broad coalition of civil society, labor unions, foreign investors and small 
shareholders with widely diverging interests. As a consequence of these initiatives, regulation 
ratings by the Fraser Institute increased significantly (Graph 3), the KFTC significantly increased the 
costs of unfair business practices (Graph 4), and market concentration went down (Graph 5). 
 
  
                                               
6
 For more information on the Emergency decree for economic stability and growth see for example You (2005:29ff). 
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Figure 3: Deregulation (Source: Fraser Institute, economic freedom of the world) 
 
 
Figure 4: Activating the KFTC (Source: KFTC, statistical yearbook 2009) 
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Figure 5: Source: KFTC, statistical yearbook 2010 
 
 
In his analysis, Kalinowski (2009) comes to the conclusion that “it is still too early for a final 
judgment on the market reforms” (ibid: 296) but finds some evidence that they might have even 
“strengthened the Chaebol after they adapted to the new environment” (ibid: 297). While 
deregulation of the labor market and various management reforms made the Chaebols more 
profitable, it weakened the political support of the Democratic Party that promised to reduce social 
injustice and only achieved small increases in social security expenditure. Furthermore the 
importance of the Chaebol’s export earnings to repay the international loans as well as the 
worsening reputation of foreign investors due to their short term speculation, shady deals and 
allegations of tax evasion played into the hands of the Grand National Party and the re-emergence 
of a former CEO of Hyundai as president in the 2008 elections. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Transitions to good governance are very complex and take very long. While this study has therefore 
tried to trace transition all the way back to the land reform of the 50s and the economic 
development of the 60s-80s it is still impossible to fully judge the impact of a rather young wave of 
democratization. Throughout its history, Korea provides evidence for very different claims, ranging 
from the importance of US influence, to the success of Japanese-style state-centered development 
and from short term costs and long term benefits of liberal democracy to state capture under good 
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governance. In comparison to other countries in the region (e.g. the Philippines) South Korea, like 
Taiwan, managed to reform land ownership, redistribute wealth and foster education as well as 
economic growth. But with a focus on SMEs Taiwan achieved better governance than South Korea, 
where a few families and enterprises managed to establish a degree of economic power that makes 
it hard to reduce their influence on politics.  
Given the importance of the Chaebol, their involvement in scandals of political finance, their 
influence on policy making, and on public opinion, policies to reduce their power and influence are 
crucial to fight corruption. This involved making use of the policy window that opened with the Asian 
crisis and with the support of the IMF that seems ideally suited for such a task. It further built upon 
empowering the existing anti-trust office with quasi-judicial power, a president from the opposition 
party that traditionally receives less political funds from the Chaebol, labor unions that were brought 
on board with the help of increasing social security expenditure, as well as pressure from 
international investors and small shareholders that suffer from corrupt dealings in the interest of the 
owner-families. On a more pessimistic note, the presidential elections of 2008 brought to power the 
former CEO of Hyundai (one of the Chaebols) from the Grand Nationalist Party that traditionally 
equates big business interest with economic growth in the public interest.  
Apart from the reduction of market concentration and economic power that was the focus of this 
paper, Korea can provide interesting lessons on the interplay between economic development, 
education, the role of the state and corruption. More recently the protection and payment of 
whistleblowers or the effects of increasing decentralization without sufficient checks for corruption, 
are other interesting fields for further study. 
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